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The Mixed Armistice Commissions (MAC) is an organisation for monitoring the ceasefire along the lines set by the General Armistice Agreements. It was composed of United Nations Military Observers and was part of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization peacekeeping force in the Middle East.〔(UN Doc S/1357 26 July 1949 )〕 The MAC comprised on four sections to monitor each of the four truce agreements, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan/Israel MAC, the Israel/Syrian MAC, the Israel/Lebanon MAC and the Egypt/Israel MAC. The various MACs were located on the cease fire lines and, through close liaison with headquarters in Jerusalem, were charged with supervising the truce, investigating border incidents, and taking remedial action to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. ==Background== From the Arab Israeli conflict the United Nations inaugurated the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization〔( Appointment and terms of reference of a United Nations Mediator in Palestine UN Doc A/RES/186 (S-2) 14 May 1948 )〕〔(UN Security Council Resolution 50 UN Doc S/RES/50 (1948) S/801 29 May 1948 )〕〔(UN Security Council Resolution 73 UN Doc S/RES/73 (1949) S/1376, II 11 August 1949 )〕 (UNTSO), this became the premier UN peacekeeping organization in the Middle East. It was clearly given a bi-fold mission which reads as follows: "first, to observe and report on the truce which was established on June 18, 1948, and, secondly, to maintain the organization of the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MAC).〔(1st Special session of the UN General Assembly ST/DPI/SER.A/47 20 April 1949 Background Paper No. 47 )〕 Included in each General Armistice Agreement〔(Egypt Israel Armistice Agreement UN Doc S/1264/Corr.1 23 February 1949 )〕〔(Lebanon Israel Armistice Agreement UN Doc S/1296 23 March 1949 )〕〔(UN Doc S/1302/Rev.1 of 3 April 1949 ) Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom Israel Armistice Agreement〕〔(Syria Israel Armistice Agreement UN Doc S/1353 20 July 1949 )〕 was a clause which provided for the creation of Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs). The MACs were composed of an equal amount of representatives from the participating factions to the Armistices (one MAC for Israel and each of her bordering countries). UNTSO provided the chairman which was always its ranking member. In the same accord, UNTSO provided each MAC with a number of observers to detail the nature of complaints (regardless of which country who had lodged the grievance) in order to preserve the Truce. Logistic and administrative support grew within UNTSO as the observers were placed in remote locations. This requirement laid the foundation for UNTSO's existing support structure as we know it today. UNTSO formed four separate Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs),〔(Functions and Powers of the Mixed Armistice Commissions UN Doc A/AC.25/W/39 7 March 1950 )〕 with five members in the case of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan/Israel MAC and the Israel/Syrian MAC〔(The Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement Working Paper UN Doc A/AC.25/W/20 4 August 1949 )〕 with seven in the case of Egypt/Israel MAC and Lebanon/Israel MAC, of whom each Party to the Agreement designated two in the case of HKJ/I MAC and the I/S MAC with three designated from each party I/E MAC and I/L MAC and whose Chairman was to be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the Observer personnel of that Organization designated by him following consultation with both Parties to the Agreement, who cast the deciding vote in any violation investigation. The observers’ responsibilities consisted of investigating complaints brought by one or both parties, observe the ceasefires to theoretically supervise the execution of the provisions of the GAAs and to report to the UN. The partiality mechanism inherent in MAC voting soon damaged relations with both sides. UNTSO chairmen sided with one or other of the parties during an investigation, but they had no effective mechanism to sanction the guilty. UNTSO’s role was simply to supply the UN with “adequate and objective information of such kind as may be required, rather than to enforce agreements or make peace.” The Military Observers (MOs’) recorded tabulations and handed down judgements resulted in nothing concrete, not even shaming the parties in the court of world opinion. UNTSO’s understaffed and unarmed investigators could not supervise, let alone enforce, the armistice agreements. Moreover, when the organization refused to consistently side with the Israeli version of events, its one common member obstructed the entire operation. For this reason, most Canadian MOs came to the region pro-Israeli, and departed pro-Arab.〔E H Hutchison “Violent Truce”〕 In spite of its questionable relevance UNTSO kept on, maintaining an international presence on the ground in Israel proper, nurturing a core group familiar with regional problems, and forming the proto-nuclei for inevitable future peacekeeping operations. The MACs were very different from one another, bringing about four unique UNTSO peacekeeping missions. Disputes on the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC) centred on the most precious Middle Eastern commodity: water. Contentions in the HKJIMAC concerned the divided city of Jerusalem,〔(JERUSALEM AREA AND PROTECTION OF THE HOLY PLACES UN Doc T/681 1 June 1950 )〕 the Mount Scopus Israeli enclave in Jerusalem, Latrun and infiltration across the armistice demarcation line. The infiltration by Palestinians was initially unarmed groups crossing to regain possessions, harvest their crops or visit relatives; later infiltrations became armed individuals and then progressing into small retaliatory raids.〔Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War... By Benny Morris p. 38.〕 As Pasha Glubb explained:- Some deep psychological urge which impels a peasant to cling to and die on his land. A great many of these wretched people are killed now, picking their own oranges and olives just beyond the line. The value of the fruit is often negligible. If the Jewish patrols see him he is shot dead on the spot, without questions. But they will persist in returning to their farms and gardens.〔Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War ... By Benny Morris p. 37〕 Israeli infiltration being organised retaliatory raids by military units such as Qibya〔(CoS Vagn Bennike’s UNTSO Report UN Doc S/PV.630 27 October 1953 )〕 and Nahhalin raids.〔(CoS UNTSO’s Report UN Doc S/3251 25 June 1954 )〕 Israel’s frustration with the UN and the other parties led to their withdrawal from ISMAC in 1951 and HKJIMAC in 1954. The functioning of the Israel Lebanon MAC remained smooth due to the more relaxed attitude of the Israeli patrols towards returnees and infiltrators.〔Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War ... By Benny Morris p. 39.〕 Disputes with Egypt, who banned Israel-bound shipping from the Suez Canal〔(UN Security Council Resolution 95 UN Doc S/RES/95 (1951) S/2322 1 September 1951 )〕〔(CoS UNTSO’s Report UN Doc S/2194 13 June 1951 )〕 and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba,〔(UN Security Council Draft Resolution S/3188 19 March 1954 )〕 pertained to the al-Auja DMZ. By 1955, Israel ceased attending the Egyptian MAC and stepped up raids into the Gaza Strip and Sinai to which Egypt retaliated by sponsoring the Palestinian fedayeen (self-sacrificer) raids. The full-scale 1956 invasion of Egypt by British, French and Israeli forces, The invasion followed Egypt's decision of 26 July 1956 to nationalize the Suez Canal after the withdrawal of an offer by Britain and the United States to fund the building of the Aswan Dam.The invasion demonstrated UNTSO’s irrelevance in the process. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Mixed Armistice Commissions」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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